This study employs a stated choice experiment to identify producer preferences for contracts to produce a risky bioenergy crop. The study develops a theoretical framework that takes into account subjective risk preference and perception information while also accounting for heterogeneous status-quo (i.e., current crop) alternatives. Results from our Random Parameter Logit model indicate that price, biorefinery harvest, and establishment cost-share all had significant positive effects on the probability of a producer accepting a contract, whereas contract length have a negative effect. The study also finds evidence of significant preference heterogeneity in producer preferences for biorefinery harvest, yield insurance, and contract length. Incorporating subjective risk perception and risk preference information, as well as accounting for heterogeneous status-quo alternatives in the decision framework improves overall model performance.
4 switching crops, to be higher than the expected returns from their current crop (Song et al. 2011) .
As a result, particular contract attributes are important at the margin.
The literature has shown that contract attributes which may be of interest to producers may include price per ton of harvested biomass crop, contract length, availability of yield insurance, biorefinery harvest (versus self-harvest), and establishment cost-share (Bergtold et al. 2014 ). Other factors that have been shown to influence an individual's decisions under risk are subjective risk perceptions and risk preferences (Petrolia et al. 2015; Petrolia et al. 2013; Lusk and Coble 2005) . However, no research has been conducted that specifically addresses how these latter factors affect producers' decisions for accepting contracts to produce biomass crops.
Furthermore, no previous research has provided a theoretically-consistent framework through which to analyze such decisions. This research provides these important contributions to the literature.
Past studies regarding cellulosic feedstock production were focused on the feasibility (both economic and technical) and the potential supply of alternative sources of cellulosic biofuel feedstock (e.g. Bangsund et al. 2008; Bruce et al. 2007; De La Torre Ugarte et al. 2007; Khanna et al. 2008; Perrin et al. 2008; Petrolia 2008b) , with other work focusing on consumer preferences for biofuels (e.g. Li and McCluskey 2014; Petrolia et al. 2010; Skahan 2010; Solomon and Johnson 2009; Ulmer et al. 2004 ). For instance, Perrin et al. (2008) estimated the cost of producing switchgrass in commercial quantities. Bruce et al. (2007) also carried out a study similar to Perrin et al. (2008) by providing estimates of the costs associated with the conversion of land for traditional crop production to the production of switchgrass. Bergtold et al. (2014) employed survey methods to study Kansas farmers' willingness to produce alternative cellulosic biofuel feedstocks under alternative contractual, harvesting, and market arrangements. Altman et al. (2015) investigated the effect of price variability and producer characteristics on producers' willingness to supply biomass (specifically, straw, corn stover, and hay). Mooney, Barham, and Lian (2015) also used contingent valuation data to analyze the near-term supply response for corn stover and switchgrass.
We propose an econometric specification to model the effect of contract attributes on producer preferences that is consistent with expected utility. The attributes tested are biorefinery harvest, availability of yield insurance, crop establishment cost-share, and contract length. Our specification incorporates individual-specific risk preferences (i.e., a risk aversion coefficient) and risk perceptions (i.e., subjective mean and variance associated with crop yields).
Importantly, the specification also controls for differences in status-quo, i.e., for heterogeneity in each producer's specific opportunity cost of accepting a biomass contract. Previous work has implicitly assumed a common status-quo for producers. Our specification is an adaptation of Spiegel's (2013) presentation of Sargent's (1987) original mean-variance utility model. The estimated models can then be used to construct estimates of the overall contract values necessary for adoption, probabilities of contract acceptance, and estimates of the incremental values of contract attributes.
We present an empirical application of the model using data from a survey of producers focused on acceptance of contracts to produce Giant Miscanthus. Giant Miscanthus has been identified as a high-yielding bioenergy crop that could be a more promising alternative than switchgrass (Heaton et al. 2004 ). The grass is cultivated from rhizomes and can reach a height of eight to twelve feet. It takes two to three years to reach full harvest potential. Once established, stands can remain on the field for an average of fifteen years without reestablishment or re-planting, requiring only fertilizer at harvest to replace nutrient loss (Heaton et 6 al. 2010) . Giant Miscanthus can thrive on marginal lands which are not suitable for row crops such as corn, although yields tend to be lower on marginal soils (Heaton et al. 2010 ).
We find that incorporating risk perception and risk preference information, as well as accounting for heterogeneous status-quo information in the decision framework improve overall model performance. Further, we find that price, biorefinery harvest, cost-share, and contract length are significant predictors of producers' decisions to accept bioenergy crop production contracts. Our results also find evidence of significant preference heterogeneity in producers' preferences for biorefinery harvest, yield insurance, and contract length.
The article is organized as follows. The next section describes the underlining theory behind the study, followed by experimental design and data collected; we then detail our econometric model, followed by the econometric results. The paper then ends with some conclusions and implications.
Mean-Variance Utility
Following Spiegel's (2013) presentation of Sargent's (1987) original model, suppose the utility from revenue, R, is given by:
where  is the risk aversion coefficient.
Taking the first and second derivatives of (1), we have:
Equation (2) 
Rearranging the exponent in (5) so as to group terms that depend on R and terms that do not depend on R, we have:
Substituting (6)  is the variance associated with the revenue. We assume that the effective objective function is given by the expression in brackets in (10);
Experimental Design and Data
A set of contract attributes were established for the experimental design based on a search of the literature and discussion with experts in this area. We settled on five contract attributes: 

Contract length had three levels: 5, 9, and 13 years. Our inclusion of this attribute was informed by Bergtold et al. (2014) . We specified five years as the minimum contract length because Giant Miscanthus takes two to three years to reach first harvest, allowing the producer to harvest at least two years following first harvest to recover, at least partially, the initial establishment cost.
As pointed out by Khanna et al. (2008) presented three levels for this attribute which were 0 percent, 25 percent and 50 percent.
We specified an insurance attribute that indicated whether federal crop yield insurance, at a 65 percent coverage level, was available for purchase. We chose 65 percent because it is the most common yield protection insurance coverage for most crops in the U.S. This attribute was included to serve as a risk management tool for farmers to be able to enter into production of Giant Miscanthus, bearing in mind that there could be yield loss as a result of unfavourable weather conditions, pests, and disease infestation. The inclusion of yield insurance as an attribute was also motivated by the work of Bergtold et al. (2014) .
Harvesting of Giant Miscanthus is something that would be of major concern to potential producers since producers may not currently possess proper harvesting equipment. To account for this, we included a binary attribute that indicated whether the Giant Miscanthus would be harvested and transported by the biorefinery. This attribute has previously been considered by We refer to these three measures of risk preference as the 5-point-scale measure of risk preference, the 3-point-scale measure of risk preference, and the certainty-equivalent-based measure of risk preference, respectively.
Using producers' responses to the certainty equivalent risk preference measure, we constructed a variable by dividing the lowest price respondents were willing to lock in a contract to produce their current crop by their expected price which was also elicited in another question. We elicited respondents' subjective perceptions regarding current crop price and yield expectations, as well as how they perceive the yield risk of Giant Miscanthus relative to their current crop. Figure 1 provides the exact wording of the questions used. Using yield and price information, we calculated total revenue, then, assuming a triangular distribution, we constructed mean revenue,  and variance, 2  . The use of the triangular distribution for subjective yield distribution elicitation was proposed by Griffiths, Anderson, and Hamal (1987) . The subjective questions are straightforward for the respondent, yet it has the flexibility to reflect yield skewness. Our study involved producers who grow a variety of crops with varying levels of revenue and risk, and as a result were willing to substitute different crops for production of Giant Miscanthus. To account for these differences and determine a common measure for status-quo, we used the difference between the expected total revenue per acre from the production of the current crop they were most likely to replace. To achieve this we utilized information on producers' expectations of yield and prices of their current crop to calculate expected revenue per acre. We then calculated the expected revenue difference by subtracting expected returns per acre for growing Giant Miscanthus under a ten year contract (i.e., $69 per ton x 12 tons per acre x 8 years /10 years) to obtain our revenue difference. We assumed $69 is the expected price per ton of harvested Giant Miscanthus and 12 tons per acre is the expected yield of Giant Miscanthus (this information was made known to the respondents as part of the survey). Because Giant
What yield do you consider most likely for your current crop in
Miscanthus takes two to three years to reach full harvest potential it suggests that producers who agree to produce Giant Miscanthus would have to wait until the end of the third year for a marketable harvest. In effect, for a ten-year contract, producers would actually receive payment in only eight of those years.
There were some challenges in establishing total revenue per acre for producers who chose to convert pasture. For example, some pasture producers reported their yield units in number of head per acre per year, and reported price units in dollars per pound. To derive total revenue per acre for these farmers, we consulted John Michael Riley, an Extension Economist in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Mississippi State University (Personal Communication, April, 2015) . Given the units and other extra information they provided, for a pasture grazed by cattle we multiplied the number of head of cattle per year by 550 pounds (average weaning weight) before multiplying it by the expected price per pound they provided in 14 order to obtain revenue per acre. However, there were some units reported which did not appear realistic and/or consistent; consequently, we excluded these observations from our analysis.
We partitioned our survey instrument into three main sections: The first section contained a set of general questions regarding producers farming operations. The second part presented information about Giant Miscanthus, followed by explanations of the contract attributes and the choice sets. Choice sets were designed to minimize D-error using NGENE software (ChoiceMetrics 2014). In all, 12 choice sets (rows) were generated which were put into two blocks, with six choice sets in each block. Each respondent was randomly assigned to a block. Figure 2 shows a typical choice set scenario as presented to the respondent. The third part of the survey contained risk assessment questions (for instance questions eliciting risk preferences and risk perceptions) and demographic characteristics such as age, education level, years of farming experience, etc. of the respondents.
We conducted our survey using Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics Labs, Inc. 2014).
We pretested our instrument on twelve producers from Mississippi in August 2014 and made the necessary corrections before sending the final version out in mid-December 2014, after most farmers finished harvesting their crops. Our target population were crop and/or pasture producers in Mississippi and North Carolina as well as members of the "25 x' 25 Alliance". Table 2 . Table 3 reports the crops respondents were producing at the time of the survey. The results suggest that most of the farmers produce corn, soybeans, and pasture. A single producer could produce multiple crops. Respondents were asked to indicate a single crop from their current crop mix for which they were most likely to substitute with Giant Miscanthus. This crop then served as the "status-quo" alternative throughout the choice experiment. The results suggest that most of the producers sampled were willing to substitute soybean and pasture production with Giant Miscanthus production. Grain Sorghum (Milo) 7 3
Other crops 22 9
Total 56 * Out of a total of 56 respondents; does not sum to 56 as some respondents reported multiple crops.
Of the 56 participants who completed the survey, 50 (89%) of the respondents were male and six were female. The average age of the producers sampled was approximately 47 years.
Respondents' household size ranged from one to six members with average household size of about three members. The average farm size of our survey respondents was found to be around 1,755 acres. While the farm size of our population is larger than the state averages of 287 acres in Mississippi and 168 acres in North Carolina, this is as a result of our target population who 18 were mostly commercial farmers operating on large farms. The majority of the producers sampled had been in the farming business for more than ten years, suggesting that many respondents have the experience necessary to forecast expected yields and prices of their current crops. Results indicated that, on average, about 61 percent of the producers' income comes from farming. None of the producers surveyed had less than a high-school education, the majority of them completed a 4-year degree (B.S or B.A). Table 4 presents summary statistics of demographic variables. Reported in Table 5 are the frequencies at which producers chose Giant Miscanthus production contracts (alternative A or B) or to maintain current crop production (status-quo, alternative C). Approximately two-thirds of the time, a Giant Miscanthus contract alternative was chosen over the status-quo alternative. 
Econometric model
To account for the existence of preference heterogeneity in producers' preferences for contract attributes, as well as account for scale difference (i.e. relaxing IIA assumption), we specified a Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model. Following Train (2009) and using equation (11), utility of respondent i choosing alternative j can be written as: Table 6 is a summary and description of all the variables used in our econometric models. Four alternative models are specified depending upon whether heterogeneity is allowed for in the status-quo alternative, and how i  is specified. The "Base" model does not account for heterogeneity in the status-quo alternatives. The remaining three models introduce  , 2  , and  to account for heterogeneity in the status-quo alternatives. We refer to these models by the specification of  used in each. Thus, the " In all models estimated, we implement Carson and Czajkowski's (2013) reparameterization of the coefficient on (the negative of) price to enforce a theoretically correct positive coefficient. This is accomplished by specifying the coefficient on the negative of price 22 as log-normally distributed but with zero variance. The constant and attribute coefficients are randomized and are assumed to follow a normal distribution. The panel nature of the data set,
given that each respondent made six choices, was accommodated by constraining the individualspecific attribute coefficients to be equal across choice observations for a given respondent. All models were estimated using simulated maximum likelihood with 600 Halton draws. After estimating all the models explained above, we carried out log-likelihood ratio tests to test for significant model improvement relative to the "Base" model.  , R  ) are jointly equal to zero.
Results

Producer Preference for Contract Attributes
Model results are reported in Tables 7 and 8 
Preference Heterogeneity for Contract Attributes
In terms of testing for producer preference heterogeneity for contract attributes, we found that the standard deviations for contract length, insurance, and biorefinery harvest were all 23 statistically significant. Our results indicate that 89 percent of the respondents preferred shorter contract lengths with the remaining 11 percent preferring longer contracts. Although the mean preference for yield insurance was positive, 77 percent of the respondents had positive preference parameters while the remaining 23 percent put negative weights on yield insurance.
Results indicate no significant preference heterogeneity among establishment cost-share preferences. Also, finally, the significance of the standard deviation for the constant indicates a difference in the scale of the variance across alternatives (i.e., a violation of the IIA assumption).
This supports our choice of random parameter logit model to relax this assumption. Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **,* represents significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels of significance respectively. 
24
25
Status-quo and Risk Information Effects
All things equal, increased mean net returns on a respondent's current crop is expected to reduce the probability of accepting a Giant Miscanthus contract. Results indicate a positive coefficient on mean net returns, but it is not statistically significant.
As demonstrated by Petrolia et al. (2015) ; Petrolia et al. (2013); and Lusk and Coble (2005) , risk preferences and risk perceptions can affect an individual's decision under risk. As demonstrated in the conceptual section earlier, this effect enters the model via the variance on net returns of the current crop. All else equal, an increase in the variance associated with the current crop is expected to increase the probability of a risk-averse respondent to accept a Giant Miscanthus contract, and to decrease that of a risk-loving respondent (both relative to a riskneutral respondent.) Although not statistically significant, we find the expected signs on RA  and RL  , and this result is consistent across models. For the case of the certainty-equivalent measure of risk preference, we expect that, as the magnitude of the certainty-equivalent associated with the current crop increases, the degree of risk aversion decreases. In other words, given an increase in the variance associated with the current crop along with an increased in the certainty equivalent of the current crop, we expected the probability of accepting a Giant Miscanthus contract to decrease. Results are consistent with this expectation, although not statistically significant. Although we do not find significance on the individual coefficients, we do find, based on our likelihood ratio tests, significant overall model improvement when we incorporate these status-quo and risk information variables into the producer's decision framework, and this finding is consistent across all three model variants that incorporate this information. The improvement suggests that our findings are consistent with economic theory. contract terms. At the other end of the spectrum would be a 13-year contract, with no cost-share, no insurance, and no biorefinery harvest. Such a contract has an associated price discount of $109.63 per ton. Table 10 reports 3 additional contract scenarios between these two extremes.
Overall, these results can be interpreted to indicate that, for whatever reason, while producers may be willing to accept contracts to produce Giant Miscanthus, they will require additional compensation -the magnitude of which is a function of the terms of the contract. 
Conclusions and Implications
This research provides a theoretically-consistent conceptual framework for modeling producer decisions to accept contracts under risk. Next the paper provides an empirical application focused on southeast U.S. producers' preferences for contracts to produce a bioenergy crop, Giant Miscanthus. As part of this effort, this research identifies which contract attributes affect potential producers' willingness to accept a contract. The attributes considered in our analysis were price, yield insurance availability, contract length in years, establishment cost-share, and biorefinery harvest. Importantly, also incorporated were status-quo alternatives and risk information, specifically information on current crop mean returns and associated variance, risk perceptions, and risk preferences.
Although the attributes considered in our study had been previously identified as important contract attributes in this context, little was known about preference heterogeneity for these attributes. To address this shortcoming, this research adopted a random-parameter logit model which allowed testing for the existence of preference heterogeneity for contract attributes.
Finally, the study provided estimates of incremental values for these contract attributes.
Results indicated that higher contract prices, inclusion of biorefinery harvest, and increased establishment cost-share significantly increased the probability of a producer accepting a Giant Miscanthus contract. Increased contract length had a significant negative effect on the probability of contract acceptance. This finding suggests that producers preferred shorter contracts. We also found evidence of preference heterogeneity in producers' preferences for insurance, contract length, and biorefinery harvest. This suggests that producers had diverse preferences over these attributes. Based on our overall contract welfare estimates, we find that although producers may be willing to accept contracts to produce Giant Miscanthus, they will require additional compensation -the magnitude of which is a function of the terms of the contract.
We found that accounting for heterogeneity in the status-quo (i.e. differences in their current crop mean returns and associated variance) as well as risk information (preferences and perceptions) resulted in significant model improvement. Due to our small sample size we did not find individual coefficients significant, but our likelihood-ratio test results indicated significant overall model improvement when these variables were incorporated in our models. This finding is important as it suggests that a failure to account for these differences could bias results and result in misleading conclusions.
A major limitation of the study was the small sample size. Even with the addition of an incentive -a $25 Walmart gift card, we had limited responses. Some of the producers we contacted perceived Giant Miscanthus to be an invasive species, although we informed them that the variety under consideration is a sterile variety which has been approved by the USDA. This perception may have accounted for the large number of respondents that began -but did not complete -the survey. With the recent shutdown of the KiOR plant, however, would-be bioenergy feedstock producers in the region are likely now aware of this major setback in the biofuel industry, and the instability of an outlet to sell their biomass crop should they decide to produce it. Further, the recent drastic drop in oil prices from around $110 per barrel in July 2014 to below $50 per barrel in July 2015 will continue to put downward pressure on demand for alternative fuels (Energy Information Administration 2015). Thus we can expect that the growth and development of the biofuel industry in the U.S. will continue to face major challenges unless and until major technological breakthroughs take place.
